University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Psychology Faculty Publications

Psychology

3-2016

Is the Divide a Chasm?: Bridging Affective Science
with Clinical Practice
Lauren M. Bylsma
University of Pittsburgh

Iris B. Mauss
University of California

Johnathan Rottenberg
University of South Florida, rottenberg@usf.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/psy_facpub
Part of the Psychology Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Bylsma, Lauren M.; Mauss, Iris B.; and Rottenberg, Johnathan, "Is the Divide a Chasm?: Bridging Affective Science with Clinical
Practice" (2016). Psychology Faculty Publications. 2388.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/psy_facpub/2388

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
Author Manuscript

J Psychopathol Behav Assess. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 March 01.
Published in final edited form as:
J Psychopathol Behav Assess. 2016 March ; 38(1): 42–47. doi:10.1007/s10862-015-9525-7.

Is the Divide a Chasm?: Bridging Affective Science with Clinical
Practice
Lauren M. Bylsma, Ph.D.,
Department of Psychiatry, University of Pittsburgh
Iris B. Mauss, Ph.D., and
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley

Author Manuscript

Jonathan Rottenberg, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology, University of South Florida

Abstract
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This special section endeavors to facilitate the integration of biologically-based assessments of
emotion into the clinical setting. This goal is consistent with the Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC) initiative, which aims to identify transdiagnostic biobehavioral mechanisms that underlie
mental disorders. We focus on four challenges to applying biologically-informed research on
emotion and emotion regulation to clinical contexts: (1) How do we assess emotion in an RDoC
framework? (2) How do we integrate measures of emotion with other systems in a wider context?
(3) What do physiological indices of emotion tell us about clinical phenomena? and (4) How do
we integrate physiological assessments into clinical practice? Throughout this comment, we refer
to the articles in this special section to make our points, and, when possible, offer suggestions for
future work to continue to address these challenges.

Overview

Author Manuscript

The goal of this special section is to advance the integration of biologically-based
assessments of emotion into clinical assessment, diagnosis, and treatment. This is an
important goal for several reasons. First, such an initiative can help to narrow the now wide
gap between basic affective science and clinical practice. Despite the proliferation of
emotion research in the last decade, what we know from laboratory work on emotional
reactivity and regulation is still only infrequently directly applied to clinical assessment or
treatment settings. The goal of this special section is also germane to the Research Domain
Criteria (RDoC) initiative, which aspires to identify transdiagnostic biobehavioral
mechanisms associated with psychopathology (Sanislow, Pine, Quinn, Kozak & Garvey,
2010). Indeed, aspects of emotion reactivity and emotion regulation fit well into the RDoC
initiative, and there is growing evidence of transdiagnostic emotion processes that can be
measured using multiple units of analysis (including via physiology). For example, the
LeMoult, Yoon & Joormann article (this issue) examines physiological indices of worry and
rumination, which are relevant to multiple forms of psychopathology, including mood and
anxiety disorders.
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We laud these goals and the special section for calling attention to them. The empirical
contributions in this issue highlight the clear progress that is being made towards these lofty
goals. At the same time, the special section and the articles in it have provoked us to reflect,
and to identify several major challenges in realizing these goals. Some of these challenges
have been described elsewhere (Lilenfield, 2014). In this comment, we focus on four
challenges to applying biologically-informed research on emotion and emotion regulation to
clinical contexts. Where possible, we offer suggestions for how to begin addressing these
challenges.
Challenge 1: How do we assess emotion in an RDoC framework?

Author Manuscript

Clinicians and researchers who work with emotion have long been mindful of the problem
that emotion is a multi-headed beast (Levenson, 2003). When we say that someone is afraid,
we can confirm with many types of data: self-reports of anxiety, sweaty palms, wide eyes,
racing hearts, frozen posture, a strong urge to flee or avoid a danger, scanning the
environment for threat. While RDoC focuses on multiple units of analysis, biological
measures are given the most emphasis. There is a particular focus on neural measures, as
mental disorders are characterized primarily as dysfunctions in brain circuitry, with the
ultimate goal to develop treatments targeting specific brain regions (Sanislow et al, 2010).
Although this might make sense from some perspectives, the idea that biology is preeminent is in tension with basic research in affective science, which has long viewed
emotions (and, by extension, dysregulation of emotions) as multi-system phenomena (Lang,
1988; Levenson, 2003; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Indeed, part of what makes affective
science challenging is that there are a large number of reasonably valid indicators of
emotion, from self-report of experience, to facial behavior, to a variety of physiological
indices of central and peripheral nervous system activity.

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

A first problem in taming the multi-headed beast of emotion is that correlations between
these different systems of emotion response are only modest (e.g., Mauss et al., 2005).
Remarkably, modest intercorrelations are found even when we examine measures that are
putatively within the same system, such as autonomic nervous system activity. There remain
debates within affective science concerning why the correspondence between different
indicators is so low and inconsistent (Barrett, 2012). Thus, it may be insufficient to measure
only a single response or response system. If clinicians respond by measuring multiple
responses or systems, affective science cannot yet provide strong guidance concerning how
to integrate what is often discrepant information across systems. Findings such as these fed
worries about the very scientific validity of the construct of emotion (Barrett, 2012; 2006).
At a minimum, the phenomenon of modest intercorrelations among emotion indicators casts
doubt on the idea that we could ever safely take a part of emotion (biology) for the whole.
Apart from this issue of the part-whole relationship (see Barrett 2009 for further discussion),
the field has not come to consensus on what are the biological indicators of emotion (despite
many promising leads). For example, meta-analytic studies have shown that several brain
areas are sensitive to emotion (e.g., amygdala, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), but no brain
areas have been linked invariably to specific discrete emotions (Lindquist et al., 2012).
Similarly, while studies of the autonomic nervous system have been successful at measuring
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components of emotion, such as arousal (Lang, 1988), these measures have shown only a
limited ability to distinguish between various emotions (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen,
Poehlmann & Ito, 2000).
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Although RDoC and other critics of the DSM system have rightly criticized the overreliance
on self-report for diagnosis and assessment, subjective experience is a critical component of
mental disorders and likely to remain so in future diagnostic manuals. For the foreseeable
future, if a patient reports excellent emotional health, there will be no biological basis to
refer him/her to psychotherapy. Along these lines, Franklin, Jamieson, Glenn & Nock (2015)
and Miller (2010) observe, subjective mental phenomena (such as emotion) are not the same
as objective physical phenomena, and by forcing this translation important information is
lost. Kosslyn and Koenig (1992) provide the analogy of “replacing a description of
architecture with a description of building materials. Although the nature of the materials
restricts the kind of building that can be built, it does not characterize their function or
design” (p. 4).” It is uncertain that an understanding of neurotransmitters and brain circuits
alone can adequately describe the complexity of emotions.
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As materialists, we and most scientists believe that psychological states are ultimately
mediated by the brain and involve brain circuitry on some level. Biological measures are
important and we all use them in our own research. Biological indices may constrain other
aspects of the emotional system or identify risk factors before symptoms even arise. At the
same time, whether biological measures of emotion should be seen as the “the first among
equals” is an empirical question and should be decided on the basis of incremental clinical
utility –for diagnosis or treatment decisions—for use of biological indices over other
measures of emotion (e.g., Youngstrom & De Los Reyes, 2015). It remains to be seen
whether the brain (or another biological system) is an optimal level of analysis to understand
a construct like emotion that is also shaped by strong cultural and social forces that are
exceedingly difficult to reduce to biology (see Berenbaum, 2013, Miller, 2010, for
discussions). Our concern is that it is premature to assume biological measures are primary
(and causally occur first), and that this holding this assumption might close off other
important lines of work to understand emotion in all its complexity.
Challenge 2: How do we integrate measures of emotion with other systems in a wider
context?

Author Manuscript

Apart from the difficulty of integrating biological measures of emotion across multiple
systems (e.g., subjective experience, behavior, physiology, neural measures), there is the
challenge of integrating emotion in the larger systems in which it is embedded, such as
social, cultural, and developmental frameworks. Developmental processes and
environmental factors are a component of RDoC but they are not a major focus of the
framework, which is seeking relatively invariant markers of psychopathology.
Franklin et al. (2013) proposed that developmental psychopathology frameworks could
inform the challenge of the RDoC endeavor to integrate across multiple systems.
Developmental frameworks do not give the primacy to biological measures that RDoC does
(Cicchetti, 1993; Rutter & Stroufe, 2000), but instead focuses on interactions between
biological measures (including psychophysiology) and the environment, such as adverse life
J Psychopathol Behav Assess. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 March 01.
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events, and emphasizes moderators of these pathways and changes across the lifespan
(Franklin, et al., 2013). Indeed, examination of cross-level interactions in multiple systems
may be critically important to gain a true understanding of causal mechanisms underlying
psychopathology (e.g., Kendler, 2014).
A key point is that biological markers of emotion dysregulation are not invariant. Whether a
biological pattern reflects a specific aspect of emotion dysregulation may change both across
the lifespan and across the development of a disorder (i.e., from a period of vulnerability to
first onset of a disorder to remission and recurrence of a disorder). It is clear that the
transactional nature of the relationship among variables is complex and various risk factors
do not confer uniform risk for all individuals in the same way or the same over time across
the lifespan (Cicchetti, 1993; Rutter & Stroufe, 2000; Beauchaine, Gatzke-Kopp, & Mead,
2007).
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The existence of these moderating factors may partly explain why the literature on emotional
reactivity and regulation is often quite mixed and inconsistent, such as findings on RSA in
depression (Bylsma, Salomon, Taylor-Clift, Morris & Rottenberg, 2014). This underscores
the need for future work on biological markers of emotion to incorporate developmental,
environmental, and/or contextual factors. For example, there is growing evidence that
context impacts whether or not an emotion regulation strategy is adaptive or maladaptive
(Aldao, 2013; Troy, Shallcross & Mauss, 2013).
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In sum, even if we could find an excellent set of physiological measures indexing some
emotional process, we still must consider how that relationship might change with context or
developmental stage. While not a current emphasis of RDoC, it is clear that developmental
processes and environmental factors are also critical in integrating across multiple units of
analysis and understanding emotional process as they relate to psychopathology.
Challenge 3: What do physiological indices of emotion tell us about clinical phenomena?
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Given this pair of challenges from basic research, it not surprising that when we survey the
data we see that biological measures of emotion exhibit only a probabilistic relationship to
symptoms of psychopathology. Take, for example, the finding of low RSA levels in
depression. Meta-analytic evidence provides support for a modest negative association
between levels of RSA and depression (Rottenberg, 2007). The modest effect size leads to
the expectation that individual research studies will often not find an effect. In line with this
expectation, the Kircanski et al. paper from this special section that did not find any baseline
RSA differences in MDD versus controls. The articles in this special section, in many ways,
reflect the state of the art of the field in which designs are mostly correlational, and research
findings show the presence of a modest association between a physiological measure and a
clinical phenomenon. Relatedly, it remains unclear what the prediction accuracies are for the
measures of emotion dysfunction that are available. For example, although we can say
individuals with MDD are more likely to exhibit low RSA or blunted RSA reactivity, there is
no established clinical threshold or established prediction accuracy for how well we can
predict someone might have depression now or in the future based on these physiological
values (e.g., at what values does RSA level or reactivity become pathological?). In these
respects, at this stage of knowledge, we are asking clinicians and treatment researchers to
J Psychopathol Behav Assess. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 March 01.
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take something of a leap of faith to use physiological measures that have only a modest
association with other measures of emotion or clinical outcomes.
The modest relationships among measures and symptoms call attention to the need for better
norms in physiological measures, so that they can be more portable to a clinical
environment. As Aldao and De Los Reyes (2015) note, it can be unclear how physiological
indicators relate to clinically relevant information due to lack of adequate normative
comparisons. For example, for any given laboratory task and psychophysiological measure
of emotional reactivity or regulation, we lack clear normative data for normal healthy
populations (complicating interpretation context of psychopathology). While the range
normative levels of physiological variables is for resting baselines, we lack established
norms for appropriate physiological reactivity to many if not most of the paradigms used in
emotion research.

Author Manuscript

One critical problem is neglect of measurement error in laboratory studies that measure
emotion and similar phenomena (see Berenbaum, 2013, for further discussion). As this
point, self-report or behavioral measures of behavior, cognition, or emotion are often
superior predictors of psychiatric problems than biological measures (e.g., Haeffel et al.,
2008; Kwapil, 1998; Lilenfield, 2014). A next step for research that justifies the
incorporation of these measures into clinical assessments would be to show that
aphysiological measure has incremental validity over another existing indicator of disorder,
of course, of response to treatment, etc.
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Part of this issue can be addressed by improving measurement error in our laboratory
psychophysiological studies. For example, laboratory measures often have low temporal and
cross-situational consistency and are easily influenced by slight changes in the
environmental context or state variables (Epstein, 1979, 1980). This could be particularly
relevant for emotion regulation, where there is evidence that its effectiveness and
associations with outcomes depend upon the context (Aldao, 2013; Troy et al., 2013). It
would benefit laboratory studies to obtain more data on test-retest reliability of
psychophysiological measures of emotion, conduct more replication studies across a variety
of large samples (both healthy and disordered), and systematically examine relevant
contextual factors. Ambulatory physiological assessments in daily life may also be useful to
address contextual factors that may be difficult to replicate in the laboratory environment.
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In keeping with most prior work on biological measures of emotion in psychopathology,
three of the four articles in this special section focus on DSM diagnostic categories.
Consistent with the RDoC initiative, prior findings may be muddied since they are based on
problematic DSM categories, including high levels of co-morbidities and symptom
heterogeneity within the diagnostic categories. Along these lines, some findings have
suggested that disorders such as depression may instead reflect heterogeneous symptom
clusters that overlap significantly with other related disorders (e.g., Fried, 2015; Fried &
Nesse, 2014). Thus, in order to validate RDoC constructs using biological measures, what
we additionally need are larger scale studies recruiting individuals with a wide range of
symptoms and diagnostic presentations, ranging from mild to clinically impairing levels.
Indeed, we must be cautious of focusing our search on a specific underlying mechanism for
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a DSM-defined mental disorder when there may be multiple distinct mechanisms
corresponding to several distinct syndromes, or where some disorders thought to be distinct
may actually reflect the same underlying pathology (Kendler, 2014).
Challenge 4: How do we integrate physiological assessments into clinical practice?
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A key focus of this special section is to integrate physiological measures into assessment and
interventions in clinical practice. The editors rightly point out that recent advances in
technology may help integrate physiological measures into clinical practice by reducing
some of earlier challenges with availability, affordability and ease of use. As the articles in
the special section highlight, physiological measures have the potential to improve clinical
assessment and intervention, particularly if they can be utilized in an efficient, user-friendly,
and cost-effective manner. This special section takes us one step further into making that a
reality. Nevertheless, significant practical challenges remain before psychophysiological
measures can be brought into widespread clinical practice.
One lingering issue is the cost of the software and specialized equipment. As mentioned
elsewhere in this special section, free software may help alleviate resource issues. Indeed
Kircanski et al. (this issue) used ANSLAB for their physiological processing, which is a free
software program (Wilhelm, Grossman, & Roth, 1999). Weeks, Srivastav, Howell & Menatti
(this issue) used expensive software, but note that it is possible to do similar analyses of
vocal pitch using freely available software and an inexpensive voice recorder (which most
clinicians probably have in their practice).
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Although data collection has become much easier, it would also be unwise to minimize the
expertise and time investment still required to utilize physiological measures in a reliable
and valid way. Areas of expertise and time investment include how to troubleshoot problems
of data acquisition, data cleaning and processing, and analysis and interpretation of the
resulting data. Gaining such expertise is impeded by the fact that no comprehensive and
widely accepted manuals exist, and it can take years to become technically proficient. While
free software may be available, often free programs require even more technical skill, have
less user-friendly features, and may provide more limited technical support, relative to the
more expensive software programs. Weeks et al. (this issue) noted that they did not use the
free software because they needed to ensure that the background noise was thoroughly
removed of any artifacts. This would be a significant concern in clinical settings where it
may be challenging to achieve all the environmental control of a typical laboratory
environment. Would clinicians using freely available software be given the tools to ensure
that artifacts such as electrical interference don’t contaminate data collection? None of these
issues is insurmountable, but each could bear further thought.
Of note, problems with incorporating psychophysiological measures into the clinical setting
may vary by the type of measure. For example, measures such as heart rate, skin
conductance, or blood pressure may be more readily incorporated into the clinical setting, as
these do not require as much expertise or special software to acquire and process the data. In
contrast, measures such as pre-ejection period require greater expertise for accurate data
collection with impedance cardiography, and the quantification of RSA hinges on high
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sampling rates and more sophisticated algorithms than might be readily accessible in clinical
settings.
The Dunn, Aldao & De Los Reyes article (this issue) tries to address some of these
challenges by using Chernoff faces, a method for graphically depicting physiological arousal
to aid in clinical decision making, which is an innovative idea that can make interpretation of
complex physiological signals easier for clinicians. If developed, even patients may
ultimately be able to gain insight into their own physiological responding, in some cases. It
may be helpful for the patient to become aware of their physiological arousal and reinforce
their success with the exposures during the course of therapy. However, even with this
method, of course, some expertise is still needed to ensure that good signals are being
acquired, and that the data are properly processed.

Author Manuscript

In particular, ambulatory devices are becoming more readily available, including some
marketed to the general public for monitoring related to aspects such as exercise, fitness and
sleep, which have necessitated making the devices cheaper and more user-friendly. Many of
these devices are linked to “apps” on smartphones that are very easy to use. Some of these
may be more scientifically sound than others, and further validation is needed. However,
there is potential for similar devices and software to be developed for use in a clinical
setting. For example, Wichers et al. (2011) reviews the potential applications of momentary
assessment technology for depression in a clinical setting.

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

Another set of issues concerns the type of stimuli (e.g., emotional films, stressor tasks,
emotion regulation tasks, etc.) that should be used in a clinical setting. An assumption might
be that these should be the same as are used in laboratory settings. For example, the Dunn et
al. article (this issue) uses standardized emotional film stimuli. Such film clips are a gold
standard in laboratory studies using physiological measures of emotion reactivity because
they are readily standardized across individuals (Rottenberg, Ray & Gross, 2007). Or, take
the case of the Kircanski, Waugh, Camacho & Gotlib article (this issue), who used the Trier
stress task in a sample of participants diagnosed with GAD and MDD. Again, this task is
widely used in laboratory stress inductions (Dickerson & Kemeney, 2004). However, what
constitutes a gold standard in the laboratory may not be the most helpful and appealing to
the clinician and patient. For example, film and other stimuli used in the laboratory may not
be easily accessible to a clinician and could require computers or other equipment to display.
Further, the Trier stress task can be quite upsetting, which may make clinicians and patients
hesitant to use this in the context of therapy when it does not have clear therapeutic value.
Some of the laboratory tasks also require the use of confederates, which would be difficult to
use in a therapy setting. Instead, for example, for a person with social anxiety, it could make
the most sense to use social exposures from the person’s fear hierarchy as part of an initial
clinical assessment, followed by additional social exposures throughout the course of
therapy as the person works up their fear hierarchy. Or, in the case of a person with GAD, a
worry exposure could be used. Or, for a person with MDD, the patient could be led to think
about a current situation that is affecting their mood. In clinical settings, standardized
laboratory stimuli are not needed, especially since good normative data are not usually
available. Using idiosyncratic stimuli would also increase the feasibility of obtaining
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physiological responses, since no additional time and resources would be spent on stimuli
that aren’t relevant to the person’s treatment plan.
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Another suggestion to make these tools more clinically relevant and appealing to clinicians
is inspired by the use of Chernoff faces (Dunn et al., this issue). Perhaps instead of detecting
facial features, it could be possible to convert the signals visually to something akin to a
feelings thermometer, a common tool in cognitive-behavioral therapy. This could be a useful
clinical tool in contexts such as exposure therapy for anxiety disorders. For example, as a
patient works up the steps of his or her fear hierarchy with a therapist, a physiological
assessment of the patient’s arousal level can complement self-report ratings. This
information could help to inform the clinician about when the patient successfully habituates
to each level of the fear hierarchy and is ready to move on to a higher level. The patient
could also potentially be getting some positive reinforcement from seeing the corresponding
changes in physiology as he or she works up the fear hierarchy.
Although the aforementioned challenges will need to be addressed before physiological
measures can be adequately used to make diagnostic or treatment decisions, we may begin
to use physiology to enhance assessment and treatment in the ways we highlighted above,
provided that we don’t give undue weight to biological measures or ignore other experiential
and behavioral measures that may be as or more important.

Summary and conclusion

Author Manuscript

This special section has drawn needed attention to the goal of integrating biological
measures of emotion and emotion regulation into clinical practice. In this comment, we have
highlighted the many additional steps that will need to be taken to accomplish this goal.
RDoC is conceptualized as a dynamic long-term program of research that is a “vision for the
future” (Insel, 2010). Our view is that we are still some time off from fully validated RDoC
constructs that can be easily integrated into clinical practice. We, too, are excited about this
vision, but the conceptual and practical challenges of this integration should not be
underestimated.
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